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broad,4" but neither the terms of section 2056 nor the legislative history of
the statute support a distinction that would allow the deduction of a statu-
tory interest passing by acceptance and yet deny a reciprocal effect to will
interests.
The underlying policy of the terminable interest rule is protected where
interests are created either by statute or by will, because interests created
by statute or will are still tested to determine whether the interests will
fail because of a lapse of time or due to an occurrence other than the refusal
of the interest by the spouse. 3 The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the
terminable interest rule will allow the deduction without conflicting with
the policy behind the marital deduction, and insure that property interests
passing to the spouse under a will election provision will remain under the
absolute control of the spouse and be taxable in the spouse's estate.
The Mackie court established that alternative absolute bequests to a
testator's spouse were non-terminable interests and, therefore, applicable
to the estate marital deduction. Under Mackie a spouse can be given the
opportunity to elect between alternative plans and to select sufficient
property under one plan to maximize the estate marital deduction accord-
ing to what the best alternatives are at that time. If the testator was forced
to select the specific property before death in order to create a non-
terminable interest, fluctuations in property values and subsequent con-
veyances could alter even the most careful planning." Mackie will allow
Fourth Circuit estate planners to take advantage of a flexible planning
arrangement to maximize an estate marital deduction.
J. PE-ER RICHARDSON
XII. TORTS
The presence of a family relationship in an action often significantly
affects the rights of the parties involved.' The recent Fourth Circuit Court
interests and interests created by will. See S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted
in [1948] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1163, 1188; Brief for Appellant at 26-34, Mackie v.
Commissioner, 545 F.2d 883 (4th Cir. 1976).
12 For the scope of the terminable interest rule see notes 5 and 28 supra.
11 545 F.2d at 884; see Doughtery v. United States, 292 F.2d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Traders Nat'l Bank, 248 F.2d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 1957).
1 American Bar Association Probate and Trust Divisions, Committee on Estate and Tax
Planning, Subcommittee Report, Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction, 102 Ta. EST.
934, 943 (1963); Minan, A Scrivener's Delight-The Marital Deduction Formula Clause, 37
OHIO ST. L. J. 81, 87 (1976).
1 See W. PaOSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER];
McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030 (1930); see
e.g., Bieker v. Owens, 234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 522 (1961) (vicarious liability of parent for
tort of child); Hardison v. Gregory, 242 N.C. 324, 88 S.E.2d 96 (1955) (husband's suit for
alienation of wife's affections); Shreve v. Faris, 144 W.Va. 819, 111 S.E.2d 169 (1959) (hus-
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of Appeals case, Sims v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,, presented an
uncommon situation in which the fact that the persons involved were no
longer members of the same family significantly affected the action. The
plaintiff, Sims, and his wife were divorced in 1969.3 The divorce decree
granted custody of their two daughters to the wife' and required Sims to
maintain support payments and full medical and hospital insurance on the
two infant girls.5
In 1972, subsequent to the divorce decree, one of the daughters suffered
injuries when she touched an electric wire allegedly under the control of
Virginia Electric and Power Company [VEPCO]. The daughter brought
suit against VEPCO7 to recover for the injuries she had sustained.8 In 1974,
band's suit for loss of injured wife's services).
2 550 F.2d 929 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977).
Id. at 930.
' Id. Although the courts consider many factors in determining which parent will obtain
custody of the offspring of the marriage, custody is granted to the mother in the majority of
cases. Roth, The Tender Years Presumption In Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423
(1977). See generally Levy, The Rights Of Parents, 1976 B. Y. L. REv. 693; Podell, Peck &
First, Custody-To Which Parent?, 56 MARQ. L. REv. 51 (1973); Watson, The Children of
Armagedon-Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55 (1970).
550 F.2d at 930. The pertinent provisions of the decree and settlement agreement in
the divorce case are set out in the opinion. Id. at 931 n.1. Sims and his wife obtained their
divorce in Alabama. Id. at 930. Where both parites are before the court and the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, a divorce granted in one state is entitled to full faith and
credit in all other states. A. LINDEY, 2 SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NuPTIAL CONTRACTS
31-139 (2d rev. ed. 1964 & Supp. 1977); see Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Evans v.
Asphalt Roads & Materials Co., 194 Va. 165, 72 S.E.2d 321 (1952); U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1;
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).
550 F.2d at 931.
The daughter's suit, brought by her mother as next friend, was styled Jennifer Sims, a
child by her natural mother and next friend, Marilyn Brandon v. Virginia Electric and Power
Co., and was filed in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. Any minor entitled to
sue may do so by a next friend. When this is done, however, the suit must be brought in the
infant's name because the infant is the real party plaintiff. Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111, 28
S.E.2d 40 (1943); VA. CODE § 8.01-8 (1977).
1 550 F.2d at 931. In cases of injury to an unemancipated minor by the wrongful act of
another, two causes of action ordinarily arise. One cause of action is on behalf of the minor
to recover damages for pain and suffering, permanent injury and impairment of earning
capacity after attaining majority. The other cause of action is on behalf of the parents of the
minor for the loss of the minor's services during minority and for recovery of necessary
expenses incurred for the minor's treatment. Moses v. Akers, 203 Va. 130, 122 S.E.2d 864
(1961); accord Emanuel v. Clewis, 272 N.C. 505, 158 S.E.2d 587 (1968); Hughey v. Ausborn,
249 S.C. 470, 154 S.E.2d 839 (1967); see C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 591 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as McCORMicK]. The two causes of action that arise when a child is
tortiously injured are separate and distinct. VA. CODE § 8.01-36 (1977). See generally 1976
Wis. L. REv. 641.
The common law rule that two separate causes of action arise when a child is tortiously
injured arose out of the laws governing the master-servant relationship. PROSSER, supra note
1, at § 125. Personal injury to a servant which rendered him unfit to perform his duties
deprived the master of his services. When an injury occurred, the law permitted the master
to sue the tortfeasdr to recover for the loss of his servant's services. Id. Because the parents
were entitled to the services of their child and injury to the child deprived the parents of the
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the daughter and VEPCO agreed to settle the case for $475,000 and an
order approving the settlement was entered.9 Sims, the father, subse-
quently brought suit against VEPCO to recover medical expenses he had
incurred, and expected to incur, as a result of his daughter's injury. 0 Sims
relied on the collateral source doctrine" to support his contention that he
was entitled to recover monies expended by the insurance company in
connection with his daughter's injuries. The jury returned a verdict
against VEPCO in the amount of $35,000.11 VEPCO appealed contending
that the final settlement of the daughter's suit barred Sims' action" and
that Sims could not recover the expenses of curing his daughter since he
was not liable for payment of those expenses. 5
The Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case with
directions that the district court enter judgment for VEPCO.11 The court
held that Sims had not suffered damage because he had paid nothing for
his daughter's cure that he was not obligated to pay prior to the accident
child's services, a similar common law cause of action developed for the benefit of the parents
to recover for the loss of the child's services when the child was tortiously injured. Jones v.
Brown, 170 Eng. Rep. 334 (1794); Norton v. Jason, 82 Eng. Rep. 809 (1653); PROSSER, supra
note 1, at § 125; see Goodman, Oberman & Wheat, Rights and Obligations of Child Support,
7 Sw. U. L. REv. 36 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Goodman, Oberman & Wheat]; 1976 Wis.
L. REv. 641.
In the original suit brought by the daughter, the mother waived the right to recover the
expenses involved in her daughter's cure. Sims v. VEPCO, 550 F.2d at 931. This waiver
allowed the daughter to recover those expenses as well as damages for her pain and suffering.
Id.; accord, Hazeltine v. Johnson, 92 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1937); Sox v. United States, 187
F. Supp. 465, 469 (E.D.S.C. 1960); Brown v. Seaboard Air Line R. R., 91 Ga. App. 35, 84
S.E.2d 707, 709 (1954); Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1957); see
VA. CODE § 8.01-36 (1977).
550 F.2d at 931; see VA. CODE § 8.01-424 (1977) (court approval of settlements required).
,o Sims filed the action against VEPCO in a North Carolina state trial court. VEPCO
answered and removed the action to the United States District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina. Thereafter, VEPCO moved to have the action transferred to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(2)
(1976). The court granted VEPCO's motion and transferred the case. 550 F.2d at 930.
" The collateral source doctrine is a judicially created rule which prevents a wrongdoer
from reducing his liability by proving that the plaintiff has received or will receive compensa-
tion or indemnity for the loss from a third party wholly independent of the wrongdoer. See 3
L. FRUMER, R. BENOIT, & M. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY § 4.03 (1965 & Supp. 1977); Maxwell,
The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. Rev. 669 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Maxwell]; text accompanying note 21 infra.
IS 550 F.2d at 932. Courts uniformly allow parents of an injured minor to sue for the
medical expenses of curing the minor. See note 8 supra. In addition to the monies expended
in curing his daughter, Sims sought punitive and compensatory damages for the loss of her
services. Brief On Behalf Of Appellant at 3. Sims abandoned these additional claims during
the course of the litigation. Id.
' 550 F.2d at 930.
Id. at 931. VEPCO argued that allowing each parent of a minor to recover identical
expenses was unfair because such an allowance would result in double recovery from the same
tortfeasor. Brief On Behalf Of Appellant at 8-9.
"5 550 F.2d at 931.
" Id. at 930.
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under the divorce decree. 7 In concluding that Sims had made no expendi-
tures for the cure of his daughter, the court noted that Sims' payments for
his daughter's medical insurance were in the nature of support payments
under the divorce decree, and therefore were not expenses for her cure.'
Since the medical insurance payments had not increased because of the
injury, the Fourth Circuit asserted that the father could not recover his
routine medical and hospital insurance payments as a cost of cure. 9
In addition, the court reasoned that the collateral source rule is inap-
plicable when the father is not injured and is not required to pay more for
his daughter's cure than he was required to pay by the divorce decree."
Under the collateral source rule, when an injured party receives compensa-
tion for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the wrongdoer,
that compensation is not deducted from damages which the injured party
would otherwise collect from the wrongdoer.2' In Sims, VEPCO already
' Id. at 934. The disposition of the damage issue obviated the need for consideration of
whether the settlement barred Sims' suit. Id.; see note 14 supra. The court's holding also
obviated the need for the court to consider VEPCO's argument that upon satisfaction of all
claims from the first suit, VEPCO should be discharged from all further liability. 550 F.2d
at 934.
550 F.2d at 932-33.
" Id. at 933. The court implied that had Sims' insurance payments risen, his damages
would have been equal to the amount of the increase. Id. The court also denied Sims any
recovery for the future expenses of his daughter's cure. Id. Sims presented only one witness,
the Chief of Surgery at the hospital where the daughter was treated, who testified that further
medical treatment might be required. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 24-25. However, Sims
did not present evidence that the costs of possible future surgery would not be paid by the
insurance company. 550 F.2d at 933. Since damages cannot be proven by speculation or
conjecture, the court held that Sims could not recover absent proof of future expense. Id. at
932-33, citing Wine v. Beach, 194 Va. 601, 74 S.E.2d 149 (1953) (denial of recovery for property
damage when the plaintiff failed to show that future damage would result from erosion caused
by the defendant's wrongful removal of timber); accord, Lester v. Dunn, 475 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (construing Maryland law); Fletcher v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 93 (4th Cir. 1965) (constru-
ing Virginia law); Elliot v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 621 (D. Me. 1971) (construing Virginia
law); Trueman v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. La. 1960) (construing Virginia law);
Awrey v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 121 Va. 284, 93 S.E. 570 (1917).
550 F.2d at 932.
21 E.g., Pemrock, Inc. v. Essco Co., 252 Md. 374, 249 A.2d 711 (1969); Johnson v. Kellam,
162 Va. 757, 175 S.E. 634 (1934); Maxwell, supra note 11. The collateral source rule has been
criticized for placing the injured party in a better monetary position than he was in before
the accident. Note, Unreason In The Law Of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARv.
L. Ray. 741 (1964). Nevertheless, the rule is supported by the equitable notion that an injured
party is more justly entitled to a windfall than a wrongdoer. See Kassman v. American Univ.,
546 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Sweep v. Lear Jet Corp., 412 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1969). In
addition, the injured person recovers only once from the tortfeasor for the wrong and receives
insurance payments because of a contract that he has made with the insurance company for
which he has paid premiums. The wrongdoer is not privy to the contract and should not
benefit by it. Perrott v. Shearer, 17 Mich. 48 (1868); Maxwell, supra note 11, at 673. Most
jurisdictions have adopted the collateral source rule. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and
Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. Rav. 1478 (1966); see, e.g., Kassman v. American
Univ., 546 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Blake v. Delaware & Hud. Ry., 484 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.
1973); Haughton v. Blackships, Inc., 462 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
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642 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
paid for the daughter's medical expenses in the compromise settlement
and was not attempting to reduce its liability because of the insurance
recovery.22 The court recognized, however, that a proper situation for appli-
cation of the collateral source doctrine might have existed if VEPCO had
attempted to defend the daughter's action on the ground that an insurance
carrier paid the medical and hospital expenses.?
Sims further contended that the father alone had the right to bring the
parents' cause of action.2 He argued that since the father is primarily
responsible for the necessary bills incurred in an infant's treatment, only
he should be entitled to sue.? The court rejected this argument concluding
that the parents' cause of action could be brought by the wife, and thus,
could be waived by her.26 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that when the
mother is the parent who is entitled to recover the costs of the daughter's
cure, she may bring the parents' cause of action.? In Sims, the divorce
decree, by granting custody of the daughter to the mother, ended the
father's right to her services.? Moreover, Sims had no responsibility for the
expenses of the daughter's cure beyond the payment of the court-ordered
insurance premiums. 29 Therefore, as the parent entitled to the daughter's
services and responsible for the expenses of her cure, the mother had the
right to bring and waive the parents' cause of action.2 0
The Fourth Circuit's resolution of this case is consistent with the in-
creasing rights and responsibilities of the mother. This increase is demon-
strated by recent legislation enacted in Virginia.3 1 Presently, the mother
22 550 F.2d at 931; Reply Brief On Behalf Of Appellant at 4.
2 550 F.2d at 932. If there had been an attempt to defend the daughter's action on the
ground that an insurance carrier paid the medical and hospital expenses, VEPCO would have
been attempting to benefit from the monies received from an independent source, the insur-
ance company.
21 Id. at 933.
21 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 7-12. In the past, the general rule was that the action
for the expenses of curing a minor of tortiously inflicted injuries belonged solely to the child's
father. The father was required to pay the child's medical bills, and accordingly, most courts
held that the cause of action for recovery of these expenses belonged to him. Wade v. Rogala,
270 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1959); Constance v. Gosnell, 62 F. Supp. 253 (W.D.S.C. 1945); Goodyear
v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374, 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962); Goodman, Oberman & Wheat, supra note
8; 27 ARK. L. REv. 157 (1973). But see text accompanying notes 27-29 infra.
2' 550 F.2d at 934.
Id. Although the court's reasoning had not been used previously in the divorced parent
situation, courts had used the analysis that when an injured minor's father is dead, the
mother becomes primarily responsible for the medical expenses incurred in the treatment of
the minor's injuries. Ordinarily, the mother possesses the right to bring an action for recovery
of the expenses incurred in this situation. Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 86 S.E.2d 925
(1955); Moses v. Akers, 203 Va. 130, 122 S.E.2d 864 (1961); see text accompanying note 29
infra.
2' 550 F.2d at 934.
" Id. at 933. In addition to the effect of a divorce on Sims' responsibility for the expenses
of the daugher's cure, the court noted that under Virginia law, the father is no longer primar-
ily responsible for supporting a minor. Id. at 934; see note 32 infra.
3' 550 F.2d at 934.
3' See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra. An example of legislation demonstrating the
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has an equal duty with the father to support her minor children.32 A di-
vorced mother with sole custody of her minor child has the right to compro-
mise the claim of the child." By granting the right to compromise the
parents' suit for the child's medical expenses to a divorced mother who has
sole custody of a tortiously injured child, the Fourth Circuit has recognized
the increasing rights of the mother and has continued this trend.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis is also consonant with the spirit of the
collateral source rule as interpreted by the other circuits34 and with gener-
ally accepted concepts of compensation for damage.15 Courts uniformly
have expressed a desire to prevent the wrongdoer from benefiting from
payments that the injured party receives from an independent source." In
Sims, VEPCO did not attempt to reduce damages by setting off the com-
pensation received from the insurance carrier. The compromise of the
daughter's case included a substantial payment by VEPCO to settle all
claims including the claim for the daughter's cure." In these circumstan-
ces, recovery by the father would have resulted in double payment by
increasing rights and responsibilities of all women is the Married Women's Act which gives
the wife the same rights as her husband regarding contracts and law suits. VA. CODE § 55-36
(1974); see Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 470 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
938 (1973); Carrey v. Foster, 221 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Va. 1963), aff'd, 345 F.2d 772 (4th Cir.
1965); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955); C. VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAWS §§ 167 & 179 (1935). In addition, the Virginia legislature created the Commission
on the Status of Women to conduct research into and study the status of women and to
suggest ways in which women may reach their potential and make their full contribution as
wage earners and citizens. VA. CODE §§ 9-116 to 9-119 (1973 & Supp. 1977).
3' VA. CODE § 20-61 (Supp. 1977). This statute declares that "any parent who deserts or
willfully neglects or refuses or fails to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her
child ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court decisions of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), imply that perhaps there should be no duty
on the father to support his minor child. The imposition of a duty has been traditionally
justified by the presumption that the father, in voluntarily creating life, impliedly assumes
the duty of supporting that life. See, e.g., Hunter v. State, 10 Okla. Crim. 119, 126, 134 P.
1134, 1138 (1913). Since Danforth and Wade, however, the creation of life is subject to
interruption by voluntary abortion. The final decision to have a child, resulting in the legal
demands for support, is exclusively the mother's. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
at 67-72; see Shinall v. Pergeovelis, 325 So.2d 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Swan, Abortion
on Maternal Demand: Paternal Support Liability Implications, 9 VAL. L. REv. 243 (1975);
Note, Implications of Abortion on Relative Parental Duties, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 988 (1976).
3 VA. CODE § 8.01-424 (1977); accord, S.C. CODE § 15-21-50 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 56-
10-4 (Supp. 1977). In the daughter's suit against VEPCO in Sims, the mother compromised
the daughter's claim. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
" See, e.g., Kassman v. American Univ., 546 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Blake v. Dela-
ware & Hud. Ry., 484 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1973); Haughton v. Blackships, Inc., 462 F.2d 788
(5th Cir. 1972).
" See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at §§ 20 & 137; James, Damages In Accident Cases, 41
CORNELL L. Q. 582 (1956) [hereinafter cited as James].
31 E.g., Kassman v. American Univ., 546 F.2d 1029, 1034-35 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Blake v.
Delaware & Hud. Ry., 484 F.2d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 1973); Haughton v. Blackships, Inc., 462
F.2d 788, 790-91 (5th Cir. 1972).
2 550 F.2d at 932.
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